Joan Robinson: Investment and Thriftiness

Joan Robinson devotes entire chapters to describing the causes and likely consequences of changes in investment and changes in thriftiness. Summarize her main points in at most two pages. Why is this discussion so important for her?

The course which it is best for everyone to pursue in his own interests is rarely the same as the course best calculated to promote the interests of society as a whole, and if our economic system appears sometimes fantastic or even insane—as when foodstuffs are destroyed while men go hungry—we must remember that it is not surprising that the interaction of free individual decisions should lead so often to irrational, clumsy and bewildering results (Robinson I).

Keynes was a good aphorist. I like to think that the group he ran with in Bloomsbury must have had some good influence on him as some of his turns of phrases and metaphors stick in the systems as we move along, where people can cite the Keynesian beauty contest and make a joke about how in the long run we are all dead then someone literate enough will smile and nod at your reference. But he also had the happy accident of influencing Robinson, who was a clearer writer as an explainer of ideas than her antecedent was (see above her rejection of an invisible hand).

I’m going to turn around the question though and answer the second part of the question first. It is through the changes in investment and the changes in thriftiness which are what determines the output of the economy. In my original answer I referenced these two as the “deep parameters” we spoke about in class. When we draw a mathematical model of these or a picture of the circular flow, it shows an illustration of the ideas that she hits upon in or common mathematical language but in words.

In the simple model, savings is equal to investment, but Robinson makes a point to state that “saving is not the same thing as investment” (5) so that the act of saving does not lead directly to investment. Instead the decision to invest and the decision to save are separated.

In chapter II, Robinson looks at these two decisions separately. She describes a situation where an entrepreneur wants to grow their plant while the propensity to save stays the same. In this case, the income will grow, and wages go up meaning more money is spent in absolute terms while the same rate of saving will create a larger pile of savings.  This then rises to the point where in the aggregate new savings equals the level of the new investment.

But it does not go in reverse. New savings without being driven by new investments causes trouble in our circular flow. What happens if more people save without a change in the level of investment means that activity in consumption will fall off because there are only two things one can do with their money: spend it or save it. If more of your original income is saved in the economy, then there is less spending. And since “one man’s expenditure is other men’s income, and when one man spends less other men spend less” (7) then you have the Keynesian paradox of thrift happen. More people want to spend less money and save more money, but in the whole, everyone having this feeling is a net bad for the economy.

If, all things being equal, investment is good for the economy’s output and savings detracts from it, then as policy we want to drive investment and discourage thriftiness. How do we do that? One way of doing that is to keep the interest rate down. Low interest rates make perspective investments much more profitable and being the reason to invest, we want to keep those perspective profits up (15). What we really need is a world where “population is increasing, new inventions are constantly being made, and new territories opened up to trade, the demand for capital goods is constantly expanding” (16), then we will be just fine. But the world is not always so. Constant expansion is not the name of the game. Sometimes people do fall for the paradox of thrift and want to hold their money in. They do this for various reasons. Thriftiness may come aligned with changes in trade, either up in down. The stock prices in the news may cause someone to pull back or let loose depending on the news of the day (22). Other outside influences come into play as well, such as the state running a deficit which is thrift of another kind (22). Also seen is greater thrift in unequal societies (23), as well as moral stances socially (24).

We must remember that from a policy standpoint the more important aspect is to drive investment either through private industry with various mechanisms or with the purse of the state. It is this new consumption introduced into the system that creates employment and output. We want to do what we can to not have the savings rate increase and take the wind out of the sails of the economy, but it is with new investment that the tiller of the economy is steered.

References

Robinson, J. (1969). Introduction to the theory of employment. London.

Is There One Economics?

What I think I’m trying to ask is if there is ever really a singular thing out here that we can call “economics” as a course of study?

Because it seems so context-dependent. In our own time they literally just had a big conference with some of the heavy-hitters of Macro talking about post-crisis economics and what it should look like compared pre-crisis economics. 2008 hit us in the teeth right as we were in a period that economists were calling the “great moderation” and cockily claiming that the main macro problems of the business cycle were solved.

So maybe economics was working, but what changed was not the science itself but instead the economy in a qualitatively way that made the old science obsolete.

I think we see a bit of this in the move from Labor Theory of Value to the Marginalists – enough that we called it a revolution. What was different about the economy that Smith, and Malthus and Ricardo were studying than the one Jevons and Menger were looking at? It wasn’t static. One thing to look at would be the rise of the corporation and the diminishing in power of the landlord class. With the rise of the corporation we have the rise of a new class, the managerial class. This helped lead to the need for a new economics. Businesses were no longer the solitary price taker in the market place, but corporations which were islands of order in the chaos of the market. New economy, new economics.
What will our new economics look like?

Is Globalization Good?

I don’t know if there will ever be a final word on this argument. The Ricardian argument for comparative advantage feels right in the model, but once you start looking at the actual results of periods of globalization, it is troubling. Because what we have to be careful when we’re asking if globalization is good is who is it good for. Is it good for the world economy in aggregate? Is it good for workers or business owners or both or neither? 

For me, I have called myself a Free Trade Marxists because for me my religion has long been summed up by the call in the last lines of the Manifesto: Proletarier aller Länder vereinigt Euch!

All Lands

In the long term we have to have worker unity across cultures and languages and realize that the myth of national borders is just another form of bourgeois social control where we are angry at the wrong people. It is not the Mexican worker that is stealing jobs, but the owner of capital using the logic of capitalism to ship those jobs elsewhere or to even mechanize them away.

Because what is happening in the short term is that the benefits of globalization are spread thin. We as consumers are able to save pennies on our consumer goods at Walmart or Aldi. The problem is that the costs are spread in a much more chunky manner. If you work at the Whirlpool factory or live in the community that is supported by that factory and Whirlpool’s parent company decides to cut costs, globalization’s costs far exceed the reality of a cheaper consumer good. Your income goes to zero and you can’t buy that consumer good, no matter how cheap.

This disconnect has given rise, in concert with other issues, to economic nationalism reflected in the Brexit vote or the Electoral College victory of Donald Trump. What I’m afraid of is that these political actions won’t lessen the costs – there is no movement towards a large retraining or relocation plan. One of the key plans Trump has supported is lessening the so-called “War on Coal,” which is fighting its own market forces in light of a larger move towards cleaner energy generation. This is a move backwards. Then on the other hand there is a move to eliminate the benefits of free trade, in ripping up agreements. The hope is that these manufacturers will reshore, but the reality is that to rebuild factories where once thousands were employed will only have a fraction of that because of technological advances. And then you have to hope people are trained for your needs. This will raise costs for everyone and not be the panacea that is hoped for by the people who need jobs and have seen the productive capacity of their towns leak away. 

So politically, globalization is a huge issue in terms of how we as an individual country react to it. I just worry that in pushing economic nationalism we will be throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

Eurocentrism! In Economics?

The study of economics is very Eurocentric. This is reinforced by the reading in the History of Economic thought where once we get past the Physiocrats we’re really talking more about the history of economic thought in England – Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Bentham, Say, Senior, Mill. Bastiat is Frenchy, so he’s the outlier. Marx was from Trier but he popped on over to France and then the image of Marx is him huddled over books in the reading room of the British Museum. He lived and died in England and sponged off an Engles-man.

We don't even know Ho over here either

And it doesn’t just stop there and spread out. I looked at the list of Economic Nobel winners (and real Nobel or not, it does represent the top line of the consensus of the more orthodox line of thought) and there is one person not from Europe or the Americas. And even then, Amartya Sen was educated in the Western system. That’s weird, right? This is subjective, but I can only think of a handful of people outside of this structure, some Aussies and a couple of Japanese Marxists.

So the question is why this is. Why did it begin that way and why does it persist? In a way I can understand why the Fathers of Economics are where capitalism started. You’re not going to study something as a system if you’re not close to it. And then if you are looking at how society reproduces itself in a non-capitalist or pre-capitalist system, what you are writing has no worth as capitalism took over the world. But where are the non-European or American economists? Are they, like Sen, pulled to the western canon and system? Do they exist but are marginalized? Or are they just not there? Who is the sub-Saharan Samuelson, the African Arrow, and the Thai Thaler? Should we be doing what we can to help create these people, and why haven’t we?