Sunday, March 22, 2015

Goldratt's "The Goal": Strong Foundation, Weak Structure



I haven’t read that many business books. The ones I have are usually more poorly written than the economics books I read. I know that there is often a dedicated course in business writing in the academy, but in my experience, it isn’t a focus of the program.
So when I was assigned a long business book as additional reading for my operations management class, I wasn’t too jazzed. I was pleasantly surprised though, the Goal isn’t that bad.

To talk about the Goal, I have to talk about the structure. It is a 330-page business novel.  I had no sense on going in what a business novel would be like, and it is basically that, a novel with plot and characters.

The problem is that it is a didactic novel. That means it is teaching you something. And in that role, it is often very heavy handed. The plot is that Alex, the main character who we get to enjoy present tense first person narration though, has been promoted to be the plant manager of his hometown plant. It is not producing the profits that corporate would like to see. On top of that, the orders are late and they’re always in a rush. So corporate comes down and gives Alex an ultimatum – you have three months to turn around the plant or we will look into closing it.          

So what does Alex do? Thankfully, Alex meets an old physics teacher friend of his named Jonah, who happens to be an internationally famous business consultant. The problem here is that Jonah is always busy, so he can’t handhold Alex to improve the plant. This device is here so that you as the reader and the character of Alex isn’t told straight up what changes to make. You/Alex need to find from the stated principles to improve the plant. The whole thing is based on the idea of the Socratic dialogue –where the teacher doesn’t tell you anything but the educate is a coming to knowledge of the student. It’s really heavy-handed, since the author mentions it in the introduction and also has a subplot where Alex’s wife starts reading philosophy and they have a couple dialogue exposition-dump conversations.
Ultimately, Alex does come up with a process of improvement where he takes some of the old rules off the board and looks at defining the ultimate goal of the plant vis a vis the company and what he can do to help the plant meet those goals. He and his team identify bottlenecks in the plant, reimagine them, and the plant is a success. He is promoted to district manager at the end, and he and his team start to see how they could apply the more general principles they had determined to processes that are harder to define than movement of material in a plant. For me, the end was the weakest part because I work in service and I kept trying to figure out how this could apply to me in my job. I still haven’t and I hope there was a sequel or something that applies the goal to a larger organization.
The general processes that Alex worked out by way of Jonah (who is a total stand-in for the author) are:      


1) Identify the system’s constraints
2) Decide how to exploit the system’s constraints.
3) Subordinate everything else to the above decisions
4) Elevate the system’s constraints
5) If in the previous steps, a constraint has been broken, go back to step 1, but do not allow inertia to cause a system constraint.
 
They sound like good general principles, and they work in the book. I do have some issues with the book and the idea though. First of all, the structure of the book feels entirely unnecessary. We as the reader have very little context for what the company Alex works for even makes. It is just some generalized manufacturing plant in a nameless town. That means the process described in the book cannot be fully trusted to have worked. I would like to see evidence-based material to prove that the process works. As it, it might as well be like the mystery writer who cannot really solve mysteries but just knows what he wants at the end so he can work backwards.
Second, the novel approach is just weird. It makes the book longer by three times than it could be to convey the same information. For example, there is a part in the book where the main character takes his son on a walk in the woods with the rest of the Boy Scout troop. The whole thing is just in there to illustrate that any process is only as strong as its weakest link or as fast as its slowest part. And it takes a long time to do so. The characters never really develop a secondary consideration. There’s a whole subplot where Alex and his wife are fighting and she ends up moving out for a while and it is just ridiculous. As a reader of fiction, it is horrible. You don’t know why these characters are in love in the first place and their reconciliation is unbelievable. It is also completely unnecessary for what Goldratt is trying to teach in his book. It just adds pages and I still never really cared about the characters.
Smaller things nagged as well.  For example, what is it about the impetus to restructure the company? Do you need to be close to failure to rethink your processes? Alex only went ahead with it because he had nothing to lose. That gave him reason to change. If things are working well enough at work, why change, even if efficiencies can be found? Another is that this book has been around a while now. Are efficiencies still possible? Or does every generation of managers have to relearn the same general principle here? Further – with the decline of manufacturing in the states to more labor-intensive countries, did the companies that embraced the goal succeed? There’s no indication in the book of the real world, so that bugged me.       
                
One last thing. Alex always refers to the cars he and his wife owns by their make. He has a Mazda, and she has an Accord. If he works in domestic manufacturing, why the heck does his family have two foreign cars?

Thursday, March 12, 2015

Some Key Insights of Microeconomics


Lean Back


There was a story tossed around at some point about Henry Ford’s crowning jewel, the River Rouge manufacturing plant. It was said that Ford, who owned the mines for the coal and iron ore and the plantations of rubber trees for the rubber, would have the ships unload their cargo on one end and the other end would spit out fully formed Ford automobiles. This is an example of perfect vertical integration from tree to tearing up the country roads. It is also, what may look to be the best way to realize profit in a market system is vertical integration. A firm will not have to be at the mercy of suppliers, and they can capture whatever profit the supplier firm might have, thus creating more profit within the firm.
It is simplistic and wrong. One of the key insights of microeconomics is that there is a whole constellation of factors to take into consideration when looking at integration, either vertical or horizontal. These are termed “make-or-buy” decisions (Besanko et al. p. 99) and they determine if a firm should obtain an input from a supplier on the market or bring it in-house. The ultimate takeaway is that the profit the supplier firms create is hard to capture because the supplier firms have their own learning curve and their own economies of scale. It may make no sense for an automobile manufacturer to make their own airbags when every manufacture needs airbags, and a supplier can specialize and sell airbags to several companies. This allows the supplier to have lower costs because they are operating at scale where a singular manufacture of automobiles would have higher costs because they are manufacturing for only themselves. The potential exist for the manufacture to be a supplier for other manufacturers, but that is rare because other manufactures do not want to be reliant on competitors for suppliers. This is why Delphi and Mopar were spun off the larger parent companies, and they have gone through further specialization themselves. A further incentive to buy in the market is that by having multiple suppliers a firm can buy an input at the market price and be shielded from any supply chain disruption. Competitive firms do realize a profit, but bringing production of an input in house is no guarantee of capturing that profit both because the supplier is working at scale and there is a potential for the supplier to get lost in the bureaucracy of the firm and the potential profits instead become costs to overhead. Ultimately, it can be the firm that does the least that is the most efficient because it can then utilize the learning curve and the economies of scale for that one thing that they do.
There are other important takeaways of strategic microeconomics. An important thing to take into consideration is that the market is not everywhere and anywhere. A lot of goods and services are available through the internet. Call up Amazon and hope you find a good price and can trust the reviews, and you can buy most anything near the market price depending on how you get it shipped to you. Other products are very tied to the location of the consumer and the supplier. If a particular sweater is only available in Mongolia, and the firm does not ship it, then the buyer has to both find the sweater and go to Mongolia to obtain it. The location of a firm has some very real drivers on how much the customer is willing to pay. The ultimate cost of a good is not just the price paid in market, but also the time it takes to find it and get to it. There is the gas paid and the depreciation of the car, and the opportunity cost involved with the travel. What does a potential customer give up in terms of going to Mongolia to get that sweater? It can be so much that the firm could give them away to American customers and they would not be able to. Instead, the market for that sweater is more realistically geographically defined. Mitigating these search costs (Besanko et al. p. 179) is why it is so common to see multiple locations of some stores. In Chicago, there are Dunkin’ Donuts and Walgreens stores almost every other block. The reason is that though they sell differentiated products, the next best option is similar enough they have to put their stores everywhere or else they will lose potential sales to competitors.
A third important take-away from studying the strategy of competitive markets is the importance of the demand curve. In macroeconomics, the demand curve is given and it is more conceptual, but the slope of the demand curve is important. It is also not wholly a straight line. Individual markets have their own demand curve, and they can be empirically measured to show the inverse relationship between quantity and price, so that the demand curve is a downward sloping line. This has two interesting consequences (Besanko et al. p. 20). First is that an individual firm’s price flexibility is based on the demand curve. The less of a slope the demand curve has, also meaning the more elastic that demand is the less power an individual firm has to set prices. This can be seen in a perfectly competitive market. All the firms in a perfectly completive market have to charge the one price that is also the market rate where the average total cost curve and the marginal cost curve intersect. The downward sloping demand curve has an important consequence at the other end of potential market structures, in a monopoly. In a monopoly, the seller has pricing power, but they still have to face the quantity consequences of that pricing. If they try to take the price higher, they will lose customers. There is a theoretical point of price elasticity called perfectly inelastic demand, where the demand curve is a horizontal line, but that does not reflect the real world. Even in a world where a company had a monopoly on breathable oxygen, there would be a slope to the demand curve because ultimately, the willingness to pay would still be infinite, but the actual ability to pay would be finite. Ergo, there would be a backwards slope to the demand curve, and the monopolist is price constrained.
These and other ideas in microeconomics are crucial takeaways from the science. Some things that may look to be common sense on the surface are actually more complex once the math is grafted on the too easy narrative statements. Integration is not always perfect, there is a cost to search, and the demand curve can be limiting. Any prospective manager, as well as current manager, should be cognizant of these results of microeconomics.



References

Besanko, D., Dranove, D., Shanley, M., & Schaefer, S. (2013). Economics of Strategy (6th ed.). New York: Wiley.

Wednesday, March 11, 2015

The United States Steel Corporation: Still Building America


Careful, it's hot

      
           The United States Steel Corporation as known now has its roots in the mania for conglomeration that existed in the early years of the twentieth century. It was formed in 1901 when Elbert Gary and J. P. Morgan combined their steel holdings with that of Andrew Carnegie. The early company also housed the holding of several other steel companies that it bought out. At its founding, it was the largest enterprise ever by market capitalization ever, valued at 1.4 billion dollars (“History”). Over the course of the company’s history, it has reorganized and diversified. It bought oil companies and their related chemical divisions. Eventually as specialization came into vogue, these were spun off so the company could focus on its core competencies. In 2001, the company split to become two separate companies, U. S. Steel and the Marathon Oil Corporation (“History”). U. S. Steel has also faced competitive pressure over time. Various foreign steel companies have been able to underprice some of the smaller providers in the steel market. These companies have gone into bankruptcy and U. S. Steel has been able to pick up the companies and their related facilities and technologies. These acquisitions have happened in both the United States and abroad (“History”). Through the vicissitudes, U. S. Steel remains a leader in the international steel industry. Today, the company produces sheet steel both hot and cold rolled, coated steel, and tubular products (“Products”). Basically, if it is made of steel, The United States Steel Corporation can make the steel.
            A look the financial statements reveal some difficulty. As of 2013, the last financial statement available, the company had been through five straight years of losses (Annual Report p. 1).  Much of this can be forgiven because these five years have been in the recovery after 2008’s financial crisis, but it is still a bit troubling given that the recession ended in 2009. The company’s main product is a commodity product, and if it cannot control costs, then lower cost suppliers both home and abroad may force them from the market. On one hand, their long history is a selling point. The steel from the United States Steel Corporation can be expected to have the century of knowledge and know how behind it, especially since steel is now all the company does. They have the economies of scale and are far enough down the learning curve to take advantage of this knowledge base. On the other hand, an old company has legacy costs. The factories are aging and the labor agreements in the industrial belt still exist. The workforce is largely unionized, though it has decreased as automation has ramped up.
            The industry itself faces headwinds. The world economy is having troubles with growth in China slowing the fate of that economy is up in the air. This is a huge uncertainty as recently Chinese growth has used almost half of the global steel output (“Outlook”). Other large economies are having their own issues. The European Union has had several countries face recessions during the course of the recovery from the financial crisis, and the United States has not bounced back as quickly as some would have hoped. The global uncertainty means that analysts are predicting a muted 2% growth in the global industry in 2015 (“Outlook”). Periods of uncertainty are nothing new to the United States Steel Corporation, they have gone through the ups and downs of the last 114 years and they are still intact.
            In 2014, Mario Longhi, president of the United States Steel Corporation, laid out his plans to recover competitiveness and take the parenthesis off of the net income line. In his letter to shareholders in the 2013 annual report, Longhi emphasized improving safety, introducing more focus on the Six Sigma manufacturing process, new labor agreements, shutting down the oldest plant in the company, and investment in new efficient manufacturing equipment (Annual Report p. 3.-5).  All of these are efforts to cut costs that are integral to success in what is a narrow-margin commodity business. One final strategy Longhi is perusing is to try to close out the American market through reliance on trade agreements. Because of the thought that the American market is so open, many foreign suppliers have been accused of selling steel to the American market below cost. Such a move, called “dumping” is not allowed through free trade agreements or for members of the World Trade Organization. By both cutting costs and making sure others are playing by the rules, the United States Steel Corporation hopes to extend its history into the next hundred years.
            A preliminary look at the most recent quarterly earnings shows that there may be some life in the company and the turnaround strategy is working. For the year ending December 31, 2014, U. S. Steel was able to claim a net income of $102 million against an almost $2 billion loss in 2013 (“Earnings”). Some analysts are skeptical that the company can maintain this growth, since the declining oil prices have decimated the oilfield services. These companies are large business customers of steel, since they rely on the tubular products that companies like U. S. Steel make. However, this is one point where the recently rising oil prices may have an unseen benefit: it keeps the steel companies in business.




References

Besanko, D., Dranove, D., Shanley, M., & Schaefer, S. (2013). Economics of Strategy (6th ed.). New

            York: Wiley.

Robinson, R. (2015, Jan 30). What to Make of U.S. Steel’s Killer Earnings. Wall Street Daily. Retrieved from http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2015/01/30/u-s-steel-x-earnings/
United States Steel Corporation. (2015). Annual Reports. The United States Steel Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.ussteel.com/uss/portal/home/investors/annualreports
United States Steel Corporation. (2015). History of U. S. Steel. The United States Steel Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.ussteel.com/uss/portal/home/aboutus/history
United States Steel Corporation. (2015). Sheet Products. The United States Steel Corporation. Retrieved from https://www.ussteel.com/uss/portal/home/products/sheet
Zacks.com. (2014, Oct  22). Steel Industry Outlook: US Shows Resilience, China Lags - Industry Outlook. Nasdaq.com. Retrieved from http://www.nasdaq.com/article/steel-industry-outlook-us-shows-resilience-china-lags-industry-outlook-cm405175#ixzz3Tk2ePldx