Monday, March 11, 2019

All Glory to the Central Party: Industrial Strategies



    Define what import substitution industrialization (ISI) is. Explain, in detail, how ISI may help economic development and give examples of ISI policies in less-developed countries. Finally, discuss the main problems with ISI strategies.

Import Substitution Industrialization is the mode of industrializing that involves the “establishment of firms within the domestic economy that produce for local consumption at least some of the manufactured goods currently being imported” (Cypher 318).  The typical model includes starting with making things in-house that are simple non-durable consumer goods, anything from making clothing to shoes and glassware and even some intermediate goods like doors or cement (Cypher 319).

This lower-intensive model allows for easy absorption of potential workers from the agricultural sector without needing the capital or human capital build up that manufacturing more complex capital goods entail. To have efficient ISI, one of the keys is having a well-organized and well-planned state structure that will allow this transition. One part of this is in financing the transition to ISI, through institutions like development banks that will help fund firms who are willing to take the risks (Cypher 320, 324). The other side is making sure that the firms that are working have protection. Some ways to create the firms are infant industry tariffs, which drive up the price of the substitute goods from abroad, or quotas or even direct subsidies (Cypher 328-9).

Importantly, with infant industry tariffs, the transition away from protection must be carefully considered and planned and that plan must be stuck to, as protection creates interest groups within the country that benefit from the protection, and they must be incentivized to keep improving their own productivity so that they are competitive in their manufactured goods compared to the world market and not just rent-takers (Cypher 335-6).  This is one of the big concerns of the ISI strategy, in fact, where economists worry that the strategy allows for powerful interests to capture the state, and the ISI is not the first step to development, but it becomes pennant (Cypher 336-7).

There are numerous examples of these ISI strategies that have been successful in the wild. Cypher notes that Japan and Germany as “classic examples” (318) but doesn’t go into specifics like the timing. He later notes that Japan’s industrialization dates to 1868 in the Meiji restoration (321) but doesn’t note that the size of the Japanese industrial base in 1939 which was largely wiped out in the next six years. Other examples are the development banks of Brazil and Mexico (Cypher 330-1) to India’s growth with the partial roll-back of the “License Raj” in the 1990s (Cypher 338-41).

 Define what export-oriented industrialization (EOI) is. Explain, in detail, how EOI may help economic development and give examples of EOI policies in less-developed countries. Finally, discuss the main problems with EOI strategies.

Cypher notes that the ISI strategy has diminishing returns (354), and as we saw earlier, one of the big problems with ISI is that there is a sort of a trap in which if you set the import tariffs and protect internal industries, it can easily become not a temporary policy, but just how things are done. What a country needs instead is a solid industrial policy so that once the diminishing returns kick in, there are next steps that need to be addressed. There are a couple of different next steps. The first would be doubling down on the ISI strategy so that instead of consumer goods, moving into manufacturing of durable, intermediate and capital goods, what Cypher calls “Difficult ISI” (364).

The other option is to turn your economy outwards. Once the inward-looking easy ISI exists and has been successful, then your nation’s companies should be ready to take those manufactured goods and export them for sale one the world market. This “Export Substitution” is such that the primary goods that had once been the bulk of your exports become less important in your trade flows, and you are shielded from the declining terms of trade that typify the Prebish-Singer Dilemma (Cypher 358). Expanding beyond your shores is a good idea, especially if you are not the biggest country and you have a limited domestic market. This expansion will allow for easier attainment of economies of scale, and your national champions will become ever more efficient (Cypher 359), figuring of course that they are competitive with all other firms, or else they will die as their order book shrinks. Capitalism!

It is important to remember, that exporting, just on its own, is no panacea. As Cypher notes “Exporting is not a new phenomenon; the LDCs have always been exporters” (360). The importance is in the staging of the outward looking orientation. You can’t just open your markets and your exporters to the world stage, or else they will not have the experience and expertise to compete. Also important is that growth in human capital that is necessary to make the whole thing work (Cypher 361). It is not just the firms, but the people in the firms that have the institutional knowledge to make it all work. So, there is an overall investment need in having the infrastructure build up from roads to ports to secondary schools and universities. This has been successfully done in the East Asian economies of Taiwan and Korea and Japan, as they went from nations of little national endowment, and changed it from a liability and created comparative advantage in their own technological and managerial know-how (Cypher 361). Their managerial and process expertise grew so much that they overtook the developed western nations and the business schools did what they could to capture and replicate their secret sauce by reading books like “The Toyota Way””.

There are a couple of ways that this can fail, as noted in Cypher’s work. The first is in Bangladesh, which he notes is stuck in the global race to the bottom of the simplest manufactured goods and is notable for lax labor standards. He says this is from low state capacity and little planning in terms of industrial strategy (363). A different trap is institutional inertia. For example, some nations are stuck in primary exporting roles because they have the resources and can use those. If you can continue to export oil forever, there is no incentive to stop exporting oil and develop your industrial base (Cypher 373), though we have seen some countries like Saudi Arabia recently realize that the oil income won’t last forever and look at changing their industrial strategy. Another is lack of state ability and corruptibility of the bureaucrats, which allows for capture. One thing that is notable about countries that have successfully made the export switch has been well-paid state workers. This has allowed them to be efficient and less corruptible (Cypher 379).

Ultimately though, these are all broad strokes. Institutions matter in making sure that your outward turn will be successful, but none of the examples in a positive or negative light can be fully recommended. There are economic outlines that are available, but there are huge political issues that must be dealt with. One of the key components of this is time – if your ISI plan is going to take ten years to fully implement, your government or successive governments must have bought in. Perhaps therefore we have seen that states with one party rule for long times have been successful, from China to Singapore. But that is no guarantee, as long-tenured autocrats have also successfully pillaged the state coffers without ever growing state capacity.

Discuss whether China's development model resembles ISI or EOI

In reading the chapters for this week, I read first from the handbook of development economics chapters. What was striking in these readings is that China is not really mentioned. I think Balassa mentions China only once. It was so striking, in fact, that I had to look at the date. The Handbook has a date on it of 1989, and the references are all mid-eighties or before (typical of academic publications it seems – by the time the handbook comes out the data is a decade old). What it means is that though China is an afterthought for Balassa and Brutton, the rise of China as an industrial power has happened in my lifetime.

And in that lifetime, I have seen China go from repressive government in 1989 to member of the WTO in 2000 to potential superpower who needs to be countered at all costs by our God-King president (even though the Chinese GDP per capita at PPP is still a quarter of the US’s and the military spending is less than 200 billion a year as we go to 800 billion a year – but I digress).

What I know of the Chinese economy is that it has been more export oriented. We in America lament the industrialization that went along with the rise of our economy in the post war years, but China was the replacement for those workshops that allowed America access to cheap consumer goods at Walmart and we didn’t have to think of the labor abuses and the sludge draining off in the Yangtze river because it happened over there. But as China rose, they were able to grow huge cities (over a hundred cities with at least a million people) and industrialize those cities, even with a weird Hukou household registration system that meant that people who moved in from the countryside don’t really count as residents of that city and aren’t eligible for the cities services. There was hand wringing in the business press as China was producing too much for the foreign market but not enough for consumption at home. This meant that there was high savings rates and that savings had to be put to use – buying dollars or the building of ghost cities and subway stops to nowhere (this all the result of policy choices that limited traditional safety nets like large families in the one child policy and the limited safety net so you needed to save as much as possible).

China has been turning more towards a consumptive policy, but even then, there are still hundreds of millions of poor people who have been left out of the rise of the nation, often being the non-ethnically Han people.

An important side note is that it has been controlled by the communist party for the whole of this rise. So, it isn’t a traditionally   thought of exporter. We went from making horrible steel in the back yard to building over capacity through state firms or through inviting in foreign multinationals and giving them stilted choices where they can have access to the Chinese market and employment force, but you must share the technology you have with us. Cypher notes that the transitions of all nations except for the first to industrialize take place in context of nations that are already built, so there’s not real menu of policy choices you can take off the shelf of other countries and hope to fully replicate that success (383).


Works Cited
Balassa, B. (1989), “Outward Orientation” Chapter 31 in Handbook of Development Economics, II.
Brutton, H. (1989), “Import Substitution” Chapter 30 in Handbook of Development Economics, II.
Cypher, J. M. (2014). The process of economic development. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.


Sunday, March 3, 2019

Democracy Against Development?


 In “Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization,” Robert Wade examines economic growth in East Asian nations after the second world war. He looks at a couple different theories of economic growth, under the theory that that to understand and have a theory of economic growth, you must take in account the growth of these nations and they must fit your heuristic (4). He looks at theories of complete free market openness and a theory of simulated free markets, but through using South Korea and Taiwan as primary case studies, he focuses on combining  the advantages of markets with “the advantages of partially insulating producers from the instabilities of free markets and of stimulating investment in certain industries selected by government as important for the economy’s future growth” (5).  A guided approach to state development, Wade argues, is superior to a purely market oriented position for developing nations, so that in using these East Asian guides, then “the general recipes for developing countries would need rethinking” (5).
                In the course of the examination, Wade makes multiple prescriptions that would go against a neoliberal theory of the state, from “Use national policies to promote industrial investment within the national boundaries, and to channel more of this investment into industries whose growth is important for future growth” (350) which is explicitly picking winners on an industrial level, and one that could backfire for example, if a nation invests in chemicals and then raw materials costs skyrocket while not being a producer of the primary hydrocarbon. Other prescriptions include “Use protection to help create internationally competitive sets of industries” (358) an idea more in line with Alexander Hamilton than Anne Krueger.        
                What really struck me though was Wade’s eight prescription: “Develop effective institutions of political authority before the system is democratized” (372). My immediate visceral reaction to this was to draw a little frown in the margins of the paper I was reading it in.  Wade further extends this idea that growth will be privileged, such that there might need to be “some curtailment of the political and civil rights of those who oppose the changes, and power of the democratically elected legislatures” (373). He does address the idea that people naturally glom onto the idea of democracy as one of the highest ideals, and that this could hurt his argument, but ultimately for Wade, the priority is growth. He even looks at empirical studies that show “democratic regimens tend to grow more slowly than authoritarian ones” (374). This result is also illustrated in “Reconceptualizing the Developmental State: Public Savings and Economic Growth”, where we saw Jonathan Krieckhaus outline greater growth in Brazil after the military coup because the new government illustrated his thesis that “an equally important component of state-led growth is public sector efforts to mobilize financial resources for investment and growth” (Abstract, 1697).
                So, what we have here is a balance. A powerful state can make things happen, in the exercise of development. For me. Democracy is such an unalloyed good that it almost does not need defending. To take voice and agency away from people in the nation and completely subordinate them to the state actors feels evil, even if done in the best interests of the people of the state. The problem here is that you need an enlightened state actor in the executive if you give that power away. At issue is that there are very few people like Lee Kuan Yew that we can point to. The negative kleptocrats operating at a remove from the voice of the people and extracting the wealth to Swiss bank accounts are the ones we worry about, such as Mobutu’s Zaire that Cypher illustrates (247). What we ultimately have is a question about trade-offs that is not purely economic. If development can proceed faster without democratic checks and balances, is this something that we would want to support? Is there some sort of super-national agency that should provide checks on powerful executives and allow them sanction if the executive is not working for the good of the people, or is this just another colonial reflective removal of sovereignty? Ultimately, I don’t have the answer here, but it is fertile ground for further debate.






Works Cited
Cypher, J. M. (2014). The process of economic development. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Krieckhaus, J. (2002), “Reconceptualizing the Developmental State: Public Savings and Economic Growth”, World Development, Vol. 30 (10).
Wade, R. (1990) Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Introduction, Ch. 10 and Ch. 11.